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WALKER V. GOMEZ,
370 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004)
FACTS
Jamel Walker is a black California inmate serving a life sentence in
California's Calipatria State Prison (Calipjatria). l  The prison has four
separate housing facilities: A, B, C, and D. Walker was housed in Facility
A. 3 Since 1994, Walker has worked as a law library clerk in the Facility A
law library at Calipatria.4 The prison has a reputation for violence and racial
tension, and after periods of violence, the prison warden has often locked
down the prison, prohibiting prisoners from leaving their cells and
exercising.5 During a "lockdown," only those prisoners deemed to be on the
critical-workers list 6 may leave their cells to continue their job assignments.
7
In 1995, three incidents occurred that involved inmate violence
against Calipatria staff.8 Following each one of these episodes of violence,
the warden locked down the prison, and prison officials allowed only critical
inmate workers to return to their job assignments. 9 Walker initiated this suit,
claiming that he was denied equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 198310
because following the three 1995 prison lockdowns, he was not allowed to
return to his work assignment because blacks had been kept off of the
critical-workers lists." He sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
monetary damages, acting pro se. 2 The defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Walker had failed to demonstrate that they had acted
with discriminatory intent.' 3  The United States District Court for the
Southern District of California granted the motion for summary judgment.
1 4
Walker appealed, and after an initial briefing, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered that pro bono counsel be appointed and that supplemental
briefing be filed before review of the district court's granting of summary
judgment.' 5 On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the defendants also argued
I Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969,970-71 (9th Cir. 2004).








9 Id. at 971-72.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005)(creating a cause of action for a person whose rights are violated by
anyone acting under color of state authority).
I I Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 970 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 Id. at 972.
3 Id. at 973.
4 Id. at 972.
15 Id.
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that they were entitled to qualified immunity from suit.16
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a three-judge panel, held 2-1,
with a separate concurrence of a judge in the majority, that Walker was not
required to prove discriminatory intent. 17 They held that Calipatria's
lockdown policy was facially suspect because the state defendants openly
used only race to exclude black inmates from critical workers lists.'8 The
Court also held that while defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
from Walker's claims for monetary damages, this did not preclude issuance
of an injunction against future violations of Walker's rights. 19
ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit first addressed whether the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment because Walker failed to demonstrate that
defendants had acted with discriminatory intent.20  The Court stated that
racial discrimination in prisons and jails is constitutional where necessary to
maintain prison security and discipline, and that when it is done in response
to a "state of emergency" within the prison, it does not violate the prisoners'
equal protection rights against racial discrimination in the assignment of
jobs.2' Walker countered that even in such a state of emergency,
unconstitutional discrimination occurred in the prison's use of race in
determining placement on the critical-workers lists for returning to work
during lockdown periods.22 Ultimately, the Court concluded, relying on
Johnson v. California,23 that where defendants openly admit to considering
race in its policies, the plaintiff need not show discriminatory intent for his
claim to survive summary judgment.24 The Court decided Johnson after the
district court had already granted defendants' motion for summary judgment,
16 Id. at 974.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 978.
20 Id. at 973.
21 Id. at 973 (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)).
22 Id.
23 Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003)(finding a policy considering race as a
factor in assigning cell mates not clearly unconstitutional). In Johnson, the plaintiff prisoner alleged that
the California Department of Corrections' policy, which considers race as a factor in assigning new
inmates' cellmates for sixty days violated equal protection. Id. at 796. Summary judgment was granted in
favor of the prison by the trial court, and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, which found that the policy was
not clearly unconstitutional, and that the regulation was valid because it was reasonably related to
legitimate penalogical interests. Id. at 795, 807.
24 Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).
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thus allowing Walker to prevail on this point of contention even though he
had not specifically demonstrated discriminatory intent.25
The Court then turned to the question of the defendant prison's
qualified immunity, employing the two-step test enunciated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Saucier v. Katz.26 The first prong asks whether
the facts of the case showed that Calipatria's conduct violated a
constitutional right.27 The second prong of this test then considers whether,
if a constitutional right is in fact violated, the right at issue had been clearly
established so as to put the official on notice of its existence.28 For this
prong to be met, it must be "clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted. '29 Moreover, satisfying this second
prong demands a high level of specificity.3°
The Court evaluated the first prong of Saucier using a standard of
reasonableness that considers "whether the actions of prison officials are
'reasonably related to legitimate penalogical interests. ' 3  In other words,
under Turner v. Safley,32 there must be a "valid rational connection' ...
between defendants' actions 'and the legitimate governmental interest put
25 Id.
26 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(detailing a test for qualified immunity). In that case,
Katz alleged that Saucier, a military police officer, used excessive force to arrest him for protesting at an
event where then-Vice President Gore was speaking. Id. at 198-99. Saucier's motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the appeals court,
finding that a qualified immunity analysis was duplicative with an excessive force analysis. Id. at 200.
The United States Supreme court reversed and found the officer entitled to qualified immunity, holding
that the qualified immunity inquiry was not the same as the constitutional inquiry, and delineated a two-
prong test for determining whether qualified immunity exists. Id. First, a court must consider whether
any constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged. Id. at 201. If this prong is met,
then the court must consider whether the right was clearly established, ultimately concluding that "if the
law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based
on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. at 202.
27 Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004)(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
28 Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
29 Id. at 978 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 974. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
32 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)(outlining factors for determining when a regulation is
reasonable) Turner involved the constitutionality of prison regulations limiting two regulations: the first,
limiting correspondence between inmates at various prisons, and the second, limiting inmate marriages to
persons outside of the prison. Id. at 81. The District Court found that both regulations were
unconstitutional, applying a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 83. It found that the marriage regulation
inhibited the prisoners' fundamental right to marry. Id. It further found that the correspondence
regulation was unnecessarily broad and had been applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner when less
restrictive means were available. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the
lower court had correctly applied the strict scrutiny standard. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed in part, holding that the correspondence regulation was valid while the marriage restriction was
not. Id. at 81. In so doing, the Court outlined four factors necessary for determining whether a regulation
at issue was reasonable, concluding that (1) it must be reasonably related to legitimate security interests,
(2) there are not alternative means, (3) it logically advancing the goals of security and safety in the prison,
and (4) there are an absence of reasonable alternatives. Id. at 89-9 1.
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forward to justify' them. '3 3 Such a connection may not be so remote as to
render the policy arbitrary or irrational, while the purpose of the policy must
remain legitimate and neutral.34 If the court finds a rational connection, it
then may look to whether (1) there are alternatives by which an inmate can
exercise his rights, (2) what impact any accommodation of this right may
have on prison resources, and (3) whether obvious alternatives exist to those
actions chosen by Calipatria The Court found that the promotion of safety
within the prison after these attacks on Calipatria staff was a legitimate
governmental interest because it facilitated order and investigation following
violent incidents; however, it did not find that there was enough evidence to
illustrate a valid rational connection between this interest and the prison's
race-based exclusion of black workers.36 Because the prison administration
presented no evidence demonstrating the rationality of excluding blacks from
critical-workers lists in promotion of this goal of safety, the first prong of
Turner v. Safley, requiring that the actions of the prison officials be
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," could not be met,
and the Court did not need to proceed further to consider the remaining three
questions.37
As a result, the Court found a violation of a constitutional right,
which necessitated considering the second prong of the Saucier test. 38 This
prong requires consideration of whether the right was clearly established.39
The Court held that finding a clearly established right requires a high level of
specificity, such that a showing that "the broad principle underlying a right is
well-established" is insufficient in and of itself, and the right at issue must
"be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted."4 The Court did not find on the facts alleged that
"race-based differentiation is unconstitutional in the context of a prison-wide
lockdown instituted in response to gang- or race-based violence."41 As a
consequence, Walker cannot pursue damages, but the Court held that the
defendants could nonetheless be enjoined from future violations of Walker's
rights.4a Ultimately, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding of qualified
33 Id. at 89.
34 Id. at 89-90.
35 Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969,975 (9th Cir. 2004)(quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
36 Id. at 975-77.
37 Id. at 977.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 978 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).
41 Id. at 978.42 Id. (citing Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (2001)).
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immunity, though it reversed and remanded for further consideration in light
of the impact of its recent decision in Johnson.43
CONCURRING OPINION
Judge Fernandez concurred in Judge Kozinski's majority opinion,
but he did not join Part 2, which addressed the issue qualified immunity. 44 In
his concurrence, Judge Fernandez preferred to leave the qualified immunity
questions for resolution by the trial court.45
DISSENTING OPINION
Judge Rymer dissented, concluding that under Turner, the critical-
workers lists were constructed in accord with constitutional requirements.
46
He argued that although the lists were race-based, they were a rational,
temporary response by the otherwise racially integrated prison as a result of
the series of violent race-based attacks.47 Judge Rymer emphasized that
Calipatria's history of racial unrest supported a race-based policy which kept
Walker off the critical-worker list.48 He argued that policy was reasonably
related to the legitimate interest of safety and security.
49
Judge Rymer also argued that because race- and gang-based violence
would pose a continuing risk to inmate and staff member safety and because
Walker made no showing that any changes to the critical-workers policy
would not have a harmful impact, maintaining the status quo was not
unreasonable on this point.50 Further, Judge Rymer considered whether
reasonable alternatives exist to Calipatria's chosen method.5' Judge Rymer
dismissed Walker's proposed screening process, to distinguish black gang
members from other gang members, concluding that Walker had made no
showing of the effectiveness or efficiency of such a plan.52 Furthermore, he




46 Id. at 978-79. Judge Rymer writes that, following Turner, a court must consider first, whether
there is a valid connection between the prison policy and a legitimate governmental interest; whether the
inmate has an alternative means of exercising the right under question; the impact that assertion of the
right in question will have on prison resources; and finally, whether there are ready alternatives to that
policy that the prison has chosen, showing the reasonableness of the chosen regulation. Id. at 979, n. 1
(Rhymer, J., dissenting)(citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
47 Id. at 979.
48 Id. at 980.
49 Id. at 979.
so Id. at 981-82.
51 Id. at 981.
52 Id. at 981-82.
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governmental interests at stake.53 Thus, Judge Rymer concluded that
because Calipatria's current policy was temporary and reasonably related to
the legitimate prison interest in maintaining prison safety, he would not
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and would affirm its
findings.54
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Judge Kozinski's majority opinion only succeeded in
reversing the grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, without
establishing a clear majority on the question of qualified immunity. On
remand, Walker will not have to show discriminatory intent in his allegations
against Calipatria's critical-workers policy. Because of Judge Fernandez's
reluctance to join in Judge Kozinski's discussion on qualified immunity,
55
the larger question, as to whether this right was violated, or whether he even
held such a right, remains to be decided on remand. Judge Fernandez urged
that the Court not "pluck qualified immunity issues from the district court
battlefield" and this argument carries significant weight in a case such as
this, because the trial court may indeed be better situated to evaluate the facts
of Walker's case under the four factor Turner test.56 Moreover, significant
questions remain regarding the extent of Walker's alleged right to return to
work early amidst a lockdown in the aftermath of repeated episodes of
intense gang- and race-based violence within the Calipatria prison.
The point of contention between the majority and the dissent lays
largely in the issue of whether there was a valid, rational connection between
the regulation in place and a legitimate governmental interest. Judge
Kozinski emphasized that although the promotion of safety was a legitimate
goal during prison lockdowns following racial violence, the connection
between this goal and the policy of maintaining critical-workers lists based
on race was too tenuous to be constitutionally valid. 7 On the other hand,
Judge Rymer found a direct connection, emphasizing that because the violent
episodes which spurred the lockdowns involved blacks attacking prison staff,
it was not irrational to lock down all blacks until discipline was restored,
since common areas such as the library could be used to spread messages,
threats, and even weapons among the inmates.58 It is clear that this
difference of opinion stems, in part, from the different perspectives taken as
53 Id.
54 Id. at 982.
55 Id. at 978.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 977.
58 Id. at 980-81.
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to the cause of the violence which spurned this case. Judge Rymer relies
heavily on the fact that the lockdowns were ordered as a response to violence
in the prison in both 1994 and 1995, emphasizing that such procedures were
used to restore order and discipline in the prison.59 On the other hand, Judge
Kozinski considers only those incidents in 1995. 60 This is significant
because consideration of the 1994 violent episodes strengthens Judge
Rymer's argument that a valid and rational connection between the policy
and prison safety exists, as it shows that the lockdown and gradual release of
critical-workers was a practice temporarily in place to restore security
effectively following irregular periods of violence in the prison.61
Ultimately, both the majority and the dissent agree that qualified
immunity for the prison and its administrators exist, yet they do so relying on
different precedent, as Judge Kozinski grants qualified immunity only
because he finds that Walker has not shown that the right he asserts here has
been clearly established, such that these race-based policies could be found
unconstitutional, affirming the finding for the prison merely on the second
prong of the Saucier test alone.62 On the other hand, Judge Rymer argues
that both of the Saucier prongs can be met, analyzing all four factors from
the Turner test.63 They ultimately disagree over whether the connection
between the stated purpose of the policy and the prison policy itself is
reasonable-a question which can be highly fact-specific, or may not be, as
Judge Kozinski dismisses the connection yet finds qualified immunity on
other grounds regardless.
What does this mean for courts choosing to follow this analysis in
the future? Judge Kozinski's method is not controlling, as that portion of his
opinion commanded no majority, thus it remains to be seen whether the two
prongs of the Saucier test will remain an either/or analysis, where only one
prong will be required for qualified immunity to exist. Perhaps Judge
Fernandez's middle ground, leaving application of such fact-specific
inquiries for the trial court, will prevail, as it is clear that no single
application of the tests for finding rational connections between government
policies and legitimate objectives, as enunciated in this case will go forward
to guide standard application in similar cases in the future.
Summary and Analysis Provided By:
Georgiana Gaines
59 Id. at 979-80.
60 Id. at 971. Judge Kozinski makes clear that he only addresses the 1995 incidents because
Walker only challenges the lockdown procedures following those events. Id. at n. 1.
61 Id. at 982.
62 Id. at 978, 982.
63 Id. at 980-82.
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